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Brant: Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word

TAKING THE SUPREME COURT AT ITS WORD:
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RFRA AND SEPARATION
OF POWERS
Joanne C. Brant "
"The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,
even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. '*

I. INTRODUCTION

By enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
(RFRA or the Act) Congress has set the stage for a profound
reexamination of the legislative role in protecting individual
liberties. When President Clinton signed RFRA on November 16,
1993, he stated that "this act reverses the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith' and reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of their religion."2
RFRA is intended to guarantee greater protection for religious freedom than the Smith Court has been willing to provide
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. However, neither Congress nor the courts currently applying RFRA'
have fully considered the tension between RFRA and the doctrine of separation of powers.
t Copyright © 1995, Montana Law Review; Joanne C. Brant.
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. A.B. Cornell Univ.,
J.D. Case Western Reserve Univ. The author would like to thank Kevin Hill, John
Guendelsberger and Stephen Veltri for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Excellent research assistance was provided by David Baarlaer and Angie Hubbell.
** INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (one-house legislative veto provision violates separation of powers).
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denying free exercise claim of Native Americans involving religious use of peyote).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Signing Ceremony, Fed. News Service
(Nov 16, 1993).
3. At present, there are more than forty reported decisions involving RFRA.
Two of these address the constitutionality of the Act; neither decision reaches a conclusion on the matter. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (not
resolving constitutional issue because plaintiffs entitled to prevail even under Smith
standard); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that RFRA
claim could have been brought and that congressional power to enact the statute has
been questioned).
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I will argue that RFRA violates the separation of powers
doctrine-not simply because it "reverses" the Supreme Court on
an issue of constitutional interpretation-but more precisely
because it undermines the most fundamental power held by any
branch of government: the power to determine its own limitations. Smith is not merely a decision in which the Court chose to
abandon the compelling interest test as the standard for enforcing the constitutional guarantee of free exercise. Smith questions
the institutional competence of the judiciary and sets forth the
vision of a majority of the Court regarding the limits of the judicial function. Because Smith represents the Court's reasonable
(although not fully articulated) refusal to undertake the task of
balancing religious liberties against neutral government regulations, Congress cannot override that refusal through ordinary
legislation.

II. A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RFRA
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was introduced in
the 101st Congress on July 25, 1990, by Congressman Solarz,
just three months after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
In its original form, RFRA prohibited the government from restricting any person's free exercise of religion. An exception was
provided if:
(1) the restriction(A) is in the form of a rule of general applicability; and
(B) does not intentionally discriminate against religion or
among religions; and
(2) the governmental authority demonstrates that application of
the restriction to the person(A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.5
While testimony was heard on this initial version of the Act,
it did not emerge from the House Judiciary Committee during
the 101st Congress. The Senate version, introduced on October
26, 1990,' similarly languished in the Senate Judiciary Committee. There were few if any significant differences between the

4.
5.
6.

H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
Id. § 2(b).
S. 3254, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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House and Senate versions of the bill.
RFRA was reintroduced in the 102d Congress on June 26,
1991. This version of the bill differed considerably from its earlier incarnation. The new House Bill 2797 contained a section
entitled "Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes,"
consisting of five findings of facts and two definitive statements
of purpose.' No basis for these factual findings appears in the
legislative record. Rather, they appear to be drawn from the remarks of one senator and an academic witness who submitted
several letters and testified in support of the Act.'

7.
The Senate version uses the term "government" whereas the House bill refers to "governmental authority." Id. § 2(a); H.R. 5377, supra note 4, § 2(a). Also, the
Senate version expanded section (b)(1) to refer to "an otherwise valid statute, ordinance, or other form of rule of general applicability or action taken to enforce such a
rule," while the House version referred only to restrictions that are "in the form of a
rule of general applicability." S. 3254, supra note 6, § 2(b)(1)(A); H.R. 5377, supra
note 4, § 2(b)(1)(A).
8.
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds(1) the framers of the American Constitution, recognizing
free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing governmental interests.
(b) PURPOSES.-The purposes of this Act are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened;
and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is burdened by government.
Id. § 2.
9.
The Senate version of the Bill, S. 2969, contained the same Findings and
Purposes. Findings 2-5 could have been taken from the remarks of Senator Biden,
when the bill was introduced the previous year, or from various letters submitted by
Professor Laycock. See H.R. 2797, supra note 8, § 2(a)(2); S. 3254, supra note 6, § 2;
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 72-78 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Hearings) (Appendix 3-Letter to
Chairman Don Edwards from Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair
in Law, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin). Professor Laycock renewed
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In addition to new factual findings, the substantive provisions of the bill were modified. Rules of general application that
burdened religious exercise were no longer singled out as presumptively permissible." Instead, House Bill 2797 prohibited
all laws that burdened religion, whether generally applicable or
otherwise, unless the government could demonstrate that the
restriction was essential to further a compelling interest, which
was in turn achieved by the least restrictive means possible."
This version of the Act contained the most stringent version yet
seen of the compelling interest test-a version that was certainly
more religion-protective than anything the Court had utilized
prior to Smith. 2
Hearings were held on the Act on May 13-14, 1992."3 Thirteen witnesses testified, five of whom voiced reservations about
the bill as currently drafted. Witnesses supporting the enactment
of RFRA included Professor Douglas Laycock, Congressman
Stephen J. Solarz (who had first introduced the bill) and Ms.
Nadine Strossen of the ACLU.
Much of the testimony focussed on RFRA's possible effects
on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. This was the principal
area of concern to the Act's opponents. 4 Another issue was
RFRA's potential to undermine favorable tax treatment and
public funding for religiously affiliated groups." These concerns
resulted in a competing bill, entitled the Religious Freedom Act.
This bill was introduced on November 26, 1991. It was identical
to RFRA except that it specifically disclaimed any effect on abortion services or funding, the tax status of any person, and the
use or disposition of government funds or property obtained from
these recommendations regarding legislative findings of fact in subsequent hearings
on RFRA. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 334, 357 (1992) [hereinafter May 1992 Hearings];
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1992) [hereinafter Sept. 1992 Hearings].
10. H.R. 2797 provided that "Government shall not burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b)." H.R. 2797, supra note 8, § 3(a).
11. Id. § 3(b).
12. Compare H.R. 2797, supra note 8, § 3(b) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406-07 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
13. See May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9.
14. The concern here was that RFRA might provide a foundation for a woman's
right to abortion that was not dependent on Roe v. Wade. Professor Laycock convincingly rebutted this theory. See May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 347-50.
15. Professor Laycock has also refuted these objections to RFRA. See May 1992
Hearings, supra note 9, at 350-51.
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tax revenues.1 6
Professor Laycock and Professor Ira C. Lupu provided the
central testimony on RFRA's constitutional status. Professor
Lupu argued that RFRA could be found unconstitutional as applied to the states 7 because the Act exceeded Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment"s and was not clearly
supported by either Congress' spending power or its power to
regulate commerce."
Professors Lupu and Laycock were the only witnesses to
discuss the "institutional" aspect of Smith, on which this article
relies. Professor Lupu framed the issue as follows:
Alternatively... Smith may represent an entirely institutional rather than substantive judgment about the force of the
free exercise clause. A significant portion of the Court's justification in Smith focusses on the difficulties encountered by
courts in balancing interests in the fashion required by the preSmith law. The opinion suggests that only the political branches possess the requisite competence and authority to make
these judgments.
*..

The "institutional" view suggests that courts, in the

absence of focused legislative judgments about the impact of
religious concerns on governmental ones (and vice versa),
should not engage in the unpredictable business of assessing
incommensurables like religious liberty and government need.
16.

H.R. 4040, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(c)(2) (1991). Mention was made during

the testimony that an amendment had been proposed to H.R. 2797 by Senator Hyde
that embodied the three exceptions from the Religious Freedom Act; the actual text
of those amendments does not appear in the legislative history of RFRA.
17. This argument was also made by Bruce Fein. See Sept. 1992 Hearings,
supra note 9, at 121-28.
18. Other witnesses also addressed the issue of whether RFRA exceeded
Congress' power to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
1990 Hearings, supra note 9, at 54 (statement of John H. Buchanan, Jr.); May 1992
Hearings, supra note 9, at 51, 99-100 (statement of Senator Hyde), at 100 (statement
of Nadine Strossen); Sept 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 116 (statement of Bruce
Fein), at 92-97 (statement of Professor Laycock).
19. Professor Lupu argued that RFRA exceeded Congress' authority for three
reasons. First, the Act required the states to move in a direction that is sharply
opposed to the direction required by the Court. According to Professor Lupu, Congress can enforce individual liberties not protected by the Court only when Congress
and the Court are moving in the same direction, and Congress's position is not
markedly different from the Court's. Second, Congress can pass laws that reach beyond the Court's decisions when Congress acts pursuant to its special competence to
find legislative facts. However, this source of legislative authority is not available to
Congress because RFRA is not based on Congress' factfinding powers. Third, RFRA is
flawed because the states and the federal government are not treated alike, and the
states are subject to greater restrictions. See May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at
372-95 (statement by Professor Ira C. Lupu).
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The converse proposition, which Smith endorses, is that courts
should accept such focussed legislative judgments when they in
fact are made.2"
The problem with RFRA, as Lupu then pointed out, is that it
is not a "focussed legislative judgment" relating to a particular
religious practice or government regulation. RFRA is a generalized religious freedom statute that requires courts to apply the
compelling interest test rejected by Smith.
Professor Lupu conceded that RFRA does not supply the
Court with any new "institutional apparatus" to make judgments
involving the compelling interest test. He viewed the statute as
an authoritative pronouncement by a coordinate branch that
courts should be making such judgments in order to preserve
religious liberty.
Professor Laycock also discussed the institutional dimension
of Smith and its implications for RFRA. In his first letter to Congress, dated October 3, 1990, he noted:
The Supreme Court's reason for not requiring government
to justify all burdens on religious practice is institutional. The
opinion is quite clear that the Court does not want final responsibility for applying the compelling interest test to religious
conduct. The majority does not want a system "in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs."21
These institutional concerns do not apply to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. Congress, rather than the Court, will
make the decision that religious exercise should sometimes be
exempted from generally applicable laws. And Congress, rather
than the Court, will retain the ultimate responsibility for the
continuation and interpretation of that decision.
Of course the courts would apply the compelling interest
test under the Act, and these decisions would require courts to
balance the importance of government policies against the burden on religious exercise. But striking this balance in the enforcement of a statute is fundamentally different from striking
this balance in the independent judicial enforcement of the
Constitution. Under the statute, the judicial striking of the
balance is not final. If the Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Congress can respond with new legislation.22

20. May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 391-92.
21. Emphasis added by Laycock; citation to Smith omitted.
22. 1990 Hearings, supra note 9, at 77-78 (Appendix 3-Letter to Chairman
Don Edwards from Douglas Laycock); see also May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/2
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The testimony of Professors Laycock and Lupu demonstrates
that Congress was aware of Smith's institutional implications
when it enacted RFRA. However, both witnesses downplayed the
force of the Court's institutional argument. Professor Lupu argued that the Court's views regarding the respective competence
of the judicial and legislative branches created a problem for
RFRA, but that the problem was "manageable."'m Professor
Laycock found that the Court's institutional concerns did not
apply to RFRA, both because Congress was providing the authority for free exercise exemptions and because Congress retained
the power to modify judicial applications of the statute.
Neither Professors Lupu nor Laycock are willing to take the
Court's institutional argument seriously. This article contends
that the Court's institutional rhetoric must be carefully considered and its implications duly weighed, if only because the assumptions that Inderlie that rhetoric provide the best defense
for the Smith iecision. This article concludes that the institutional argum t, extended to its full scope, raises grave doubts
as to the coiistitutionality of RFRA.
To bfiefly summarize the remainder of RFRA's legislative
history: On March 11, 1993, the bill was reintroduced in the
103d Congress as House Bill 1308. This final version of the statute contained the same legislative findings of fact and statements of purpose as House Bill 2797. Eight different versions of
this bill were considered during the 103d Congress; the variances
involved in these competing versions need not be considered
here.
House Bill 1308 eventually became Public Law No. 103-141:
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The final version
of the statute contained minor modifications of the previous
legislative findings of fact and purposes' and significantly soft358-59; Sept 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 96-97.
23. May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 392. Lupu finds that the institutional

problem is manageable for two reasons: first, because RFRA provides the Court with
an authoritative basis for applying the test; and second, because courts are familiar
with the compelling interest test from other areas of constitutional law. May 1992
Hearings, supra note 9, at 393.
24. Finding number 5 was modified to read: "[Tihe compelling interest test as
set forth in prior [flederal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible bal-

ances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(2)(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added) Purpose number 1 was
modified to provide: 'The purposes of this Act are-(1) to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
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ened the compelling interest test. As enacted, RFRA provides:
(b) Exception.-Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.25
The final version of the compelling interest test closely
tracks the Court's use of that standard prior to Smith.21 If Congress had significantly modified the compelling interest test or
enacted a different standard than the Court rejected in Smith,
there might be an argument that Congress had been responsive
to the Court's institutional concerns. However, as this brief legislative overview demonstrates, that is not what Congress did.
RFRA directs the judiciary to apply the same compelling interest
test in statutory free exercise cases that the Court rejected in
Smith as unsuited to the judicial competence.
I agree with Professors Laycock and Lupu that the Court's
most coherent explanation for Smith is institutional: a belief that
the judiciary is unsuited to decide when religious claimants are
entitled to exemptions from neutral laws. I differ with them by
concluding that RFRA fails to take account of the Court's institutional concerns. RFRA denies the validity of the Court's institutional claim by assuming judicial competence in the face of a
prior contrary assertion. Congress did not investigate the validity of the Court's claim, did not discuss or deliberate upon that
issue and the statute does not reflect the traditional process of
legislative factfinding.2 ' RFRA requires the courts to implement

exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(2)(b)(1) (Supp. V
1993).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(3)(b).
26. RFRA thus uses Supreme Court precedent as a standard to guide judicial
interpretation rather than as a precise, detailed rule of decision. Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1993). Various
authors have discussed the difference between rules and standards. See, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1689-90 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
27. I am not persuaded that the presence of any of these factors would cure
RFRA's separation of powers problem. However, their absence does tend to demonstrate that Congress did not seriously consider the institutional argument after hearing testimony on that issue.
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a standard that the Supreme Court has deemed inconsistent
with the judicial function. This violates the principle of separation of powers.
Professor Laycock pointed out in his letter to Congress that
any judicial decisions which strike an inappropriate balance
under RFRA can be corrected, since Congress can always amend
the statute. 28 He concludes that there is a difference between
the responsibility of the courts in enforcing RFRA and their role
in applying the compelling interest test pursuant to the constitutional guarantee of free exercise. He further finds that the difference is sufficient to assuage the Court's institutional concerns.
I disagree with Professor Laycock's third proposition. This
article will attempt to demonstrate that the very real differences
between enforcing a statute and enforcing the Constitution do
not mitigate RFRA's separation of powers problem. Smith does
not reflect judicial fears of "soloing" without congressional oversight. The majority in Smith did not refuse to apply the compelling interest test because of a perceived lack of constitutional or
congressional authorization. Instead, the Court expressed a reasoned refusal to balance claims of religious liberty against neutral and generally applicable laws. RFRA is constitutionally
infirm because it ignores judicial concerns related to institutional
competence and because it is not supported by either reasoned
grounds for contradicting the Court's institutional judgment or
traditional legislative factfinding.
III. RFRA AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

RFRA violates separation of powers because it disregards
the institutional concerns that are the only intelligible basis for
the Smith opinion. RFRA requires courts to balance the importance of neutral and generally applicable laws against the burden those policies impose on religious exercise-a task Smith
strongly suggests that judges are unsuited to perform.
As noted in Part II, this institutional argument was considered in congressional hearings on RFRA but was dismissed.
Based on the limited discussion, it appears that Congress determined that enactment of RFRA was an act of joint involvement
and co-responsibility by a coordinate branch sufficient to assuage
the Court's institutional concerns. This was the theory propounded, in slightly different forms, by Professors Laycock and Lupu.

28.

See supra text accompanying note 22.
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Both argued that the Court's concern with institutional competence could be remedied, at least in part, by a grant of legislative
authority. Professor Lupu compared Smith to the Court's prudential limits on justiciability, which he viewed as entirely subject to congressional modification.29
The difficulty with this argument is that the concepts of
authority and institutional competence are not coextensive.
Finley v. United States"0 clearly rests on the authority rationale.
In Finley, Justice Scalia refused to allow federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties, finding no authority for
such jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution. Congress
responded to Finley by enacting the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990," which, inter alia, provides that federal courts must
exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties when certain requirements are met.32
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 raises no separation
of powers problem. The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by
both the Constitution and acts of Congress. Finley failed to locate
any authority in Article III or in the Federal Tort Claims Act'
for the exercise of a federal court's jurisdictional powers and
explicitly invited Congress to fill that gap. Congress responded
by supplying that authority. What distinguishes Finley from
Smith is that Finley never questioned a judge's capacity to resolve claims involving pendent parties. There was no issue of
judicial competence in Finley. It was purely and simply an authority case.
Smith, on the other hand, contains no requests for congressional authorization and a great deal of rhetoric about the limits
of judicial competence. While the majority weakly claimed that
neither the Constitution nor the precedent required the application of the compelling interest test, those assertions have been
powerfully refuted.' What remains troubling and little dis29. See May 1992 Hearings, supra note 9, at 393 (arguing that "such an expression by Congress would be analogous to those on which courts at times rely on
matters of justiciability").
30. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. II 1990).
32. Specifically, the claim must arise out of a common nucleus of operative
facts such that both claims would ordinarily be tried in a single judicial proceeding.
The term "supplemental jurisdiction" is now used to describe pendent and ancillary
claims and parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
33.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

34.

For excellent critical analysis of the Court's misuse of both constitutional

precedent and the historical record, see e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on
the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
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cussed is the Court's expression of institutional incompetence,
which seems to reflect a different concern than the alleged lack
of constitutional authority.
Smith has been criticized for the majority's reliance upon the
results obtained from application of the compelling interest test
rather than the constitutional language and precedent.' But
the Court's result-oriented language should alert the reader that
the nature of the argument has changed. An argument is now
being made that depends on neither the Constitution nor precedent. Application of the compelling interest test in the free exercise context is deemed unworkable. The majority says: "[Ilt is
horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance
against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.""
Like a high school drum major, Scalia struts out with a
"parade of horribles" to illustrate the breadth and scope of judgemandated exemptions that could be required if the compelling
interest test is rigorously applied.37 Rigorous application would
permit religious claimants to become a "law unto themselves,"
possessed of a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws.' Though many would disagree, this result is presented as
self-evidently undesirable.
Limited application of the compelling interest test is equally
unacceptable to the Court. First, any effort to "water down" the
compelling interest test is likely to undermine the protection it
provides in other areas of the law, such as speech or equal protection.39 The Court is unwilling to establish a precedent for
diluting the test in those contexts, choosing instead to abandon
use of the test in free exercise cases. The majority then finds
that any effort to mitigate the harsh results produced by rigorous application of the compelling interest test would place courts
in the position of passing judgment on the centrality of the religious practices burdened by government action. The Court concludes that such determinations are not an appropriate exercise
of the judicial function. 4
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
35. See supra note 34.
36. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
37. Id. at 888-89.
38. Id. at 879, 885-86 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1879)).
39. Id. at 888.
40. Id. at 887.
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The Court's concern about judicial inquiries into centrality is
far from speculative. While the academy's view of a centrality requirement has been overwhelmingly negative,4 courts have limited the compelling interest test by restricting its use to cases
where the government burdens "central" aspects of religious
practice.42 Scalia observes that there is no reasoned standard
that would enable judges to determine which practices are central to any religion.'
The institutional concerns raised in Smith would be stronger
if the Court had explicitly discussed the choices judges must
make in the course of applying the compelling interest test.
First, the judge must decide whether the challenged policy actually burdens the claimant's free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate a "burden" by mere allegations; such a rule
would open the courts to a wide assortment of spurious claims.
In attempting to ascertain the existence and extent of a burden,
judges have resorted to notions of sincerity and centrality, a
practice that risks undue judicial intrusion into matters of religious conscience and practice."
Once a burden has been demonstrated, the judge must determine precisely what goals are served by the state's policy,
their respective importance, and the extent to which the state's
goals would be undermined if a free exercise exemption were

41. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 958-59 (1989) (arguing that centrality fails as a device for separating constitutionally significant burdens from their less
significant counterparts). For an early defense of centrality, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-11, at 862-64 (1st ed. 1978).
42. The Supreme Court has never adopted a "centrality" test. However, in Lyng
v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (upholding government
logging operations over free exercise claim of Native Americans), Justice Brennan
dissented, arguing that the test should be whether the government's actions posed a
"substantial and realistic threat" to "central" aspects of the plaintiff's religion. Id. at
475. Justice Brennan found the claimants were entitled to prevail under this standard. Id. at 476. For an earlier application of a centrality analysis, see California v.
Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
43. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 & n.4. Professor Laycock makes light of this
concern. He says that Scalia's argument, taken literally, suggests that courts cannot
tell the difference between throwing rice at a wedding and taking communion.
Laycock says that this is a distinction the courts "can handle." Of course, one easy
example does not demonstrate that centrality is either a workable principle or an
appropriate subject of judicial inquiry. Professor Laycock appears to concede this,
since he rejects the use of centrality in free exercise analysis. Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 32.
44. For a thoughtful exposition of the burden requirement, see Lupu, supra
note 41.
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granted.45 As has been noted in another context, decisions of
this sort require both empirical guesswork and delicate computations of tradeoffs. Claimants may have free exercise rights, but
are not entitled to their choice of remedy." Judges must consider how many similarly situated claimants are likely to demand
exemptions in order to predict the government's costs in administering such exemptions.47 Smith assumes by its rhetoric, without developing the argument, that these determinations strain
judicial competence to the breaking point."
In short, Smith warns us that application of the compelling
interest test in the free exercise context places courts in the
position of making arbitrary and unprincipled choices.4 9 Because it is the application of the compelling interest test that
creates the institutional difficulty, the judiciary's task does not
suddenly become manageable because Congress can step in to
correct egregious misapplications. It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that Smith is not a decision about authority: jurisdictional, constitutional or otherwise. It is a decision grounded in
the Court's somewhat inchoate concerns about institutional limitations. RFRA disregards those concerns and directs the Court
back to the task of balancing religious liberty against facially
neutral laws. The Court has signalled both its unwillingness and
incapacity to strike that balance. Accordingly, it makes no difference whether the balance is to be struck pursuant to the Constitution or a federal statute.
Some have argued that because the Court routinely applies
some version of the compelling interest test in other contexts,
including free speech and equal protection claims, the Smith
majority's reluctance to apply the same test in the free exercise
context lacks credibility.' ° There are three responses to this argument. First, an argument that depends on the
disingenuousness of the Court is inherently troubling. It is one
thing to criticize Smith for its unpersuasive use of precedent.51
It is another to bring charges of mendacity. Since Court observers cannot know when members of the Court are being less than

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 950.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 950.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.

49.

Id. at 882-90.

50. See Laycock, supra note 43, at 30-33.
51. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991).
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forthright, the stature of the Court demands a presumption of
candor.
Second, this argument denies the right of the Court to determine its own institutional competence. The point is that if the
Court is willing (and thus presumably competent) to apply the
compelling interest test to balance governmental and individual
interests in speech, equal protection and other areas, then the
Court must be competent to do so in free exercise cases. But
Smith reviews the precedents applying the compelling interest
test and concludes that the Constitution does not require judges
to perform a task for which they are unsuited: applying the compelling interest test to facially neutral laws that burden religious
exercise." Both Congress and the academic community may
disagree with that assessment and challenge the reasons
proffered by the Court. But I do not believe that Congress may,
without usurping the Court's prerogative, find as a matter of legislative fact that courts are competent to apply the compelling
interest test to facially neutral laws that burden free exercise
rights when the only change since Smith is that courts are acting pursuant to a federal statute rather than the Constitution.
Third, there are legitimate grounds for differentiating the
application of the compelling interest test in religious liberty
cases from its application in other contexts. Nuisance actions, for
example, require the courts to balance the respective rights of
individuals or corporate entities. This is historically the type of
dispute over which courts have special expertise.' RFRA
claims, on the other hand, pit the government's interest in enforcing facially neutral rules against the rights of individuals
and religious groups to obtain exemptions. These cases force
courts to make difficult and far-reaching predictions about a
number of difficult issues, including the degree of hardship on
religious practices and the future effect of exemptions on government enforcement efforts and policy development.' Smith concludes that such determinations are better suited to the legislature than the judiciary.55 By enacting a generalized religious
freedom statute rather than a specific array of religious-based
exemptions, Congress refused to assume legislative responsibility

52.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90.

53.

COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF THE COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN

SOCIETY 101-20 (Lieberman ed., 1984) (discussing the parameters of judicial competence).
54.
55.

See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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for striking the balance, and simply lobbed the ball back to the
courts.
The persuasiveness of the Court's view that such determinations should be made by the legislature rather than by courts is
questionable.' However, the Court's power to make decisions
based on this line of reasoning cannot be doubted. Each branch
of government has the inherent power to determine its own limitations. Such determinations, when not amounting to abdication
of an essential function, are binding on the other branches.57
Judicial rulings that rest on institutional concerns deserve
the respect of a serious hearing. It is not enough to argue that
the Court's concerns are unfounded or demonstrate a lack of
fidelity to the judicial obligation to enforce the Constitution. The
Court in Smith does not refuse to enforce the Free Exercise
Clause; it adopts a neutrality principle with which to do so.'
That neutrality principle has since been applied to strike down
city ordinances that discriminate against a particular religion.59
Smith restrictively defines the scope of free exercise rights upon
the ground that judges lack competence to apply the compelling
interest test when neutral laws are challenged on religious
grounds.
Justice Scalia offers only a brief justification in Smith for
distinguishing the use of the compelling interest test in speech
and equal protection cases from its use in free exercise challenges to neutral laws:
[U]sing [the compelling interest test] as the standard that
must be met before the government may accord different
treatment on the basis of race, or before the government may
regulate the content of speech is not remotely comparable to
using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in
those other fields--equality of treatment and an unrestricted
flow of contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it
would produce here-a private right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.'
Once again, this rather conclusory observation could have
been persuasively developed. Arguably, neither equal protection
56. For an argument that such decisions can and should be made by the courts,
see Lupu, supra note 41, at 966-77.
57. Discussion of these boundaries is provided in Section VI of this article.
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-82.
59. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993) (striking down city ordinances prohibiting the religious sacrifice of animals).
60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86. (citations omitted).
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nor free speech cases tax judicial competence like free exercise
claims. In the speech cases, the Court has distinguished between
commercial and political speech; denied protection to obscenity
and fighting words; developed the time, place and manner doctrine; and generally created a coherent structure for classifying
speech claims prior to the point at which the application of the
compelling interest test is required. In fact, the preliminary
classification determines the extent of constitutional protection
available.
Similarly, the jurisprudence of equal protection is structured
around initial determinations of whether or not a fundamental
right has been abridged and whether the challenged classification involves a suspect or quasi-suspect class. These initial determinations raise none of the difficulties inherent in judicial inquiries into the sincerity of religious belief, or the extent of the
burden imposed upon religious practices. The preliminary inquiries also serve to limit the group of potential plaintiffs entitled to
the protection of the compelling interest standard.
On a more fundamental level, Justice Scalia may have been
arguing that legal reasoning is simply inadequate to address and
evaluate the merit of spiritual claims. This concern goes beyond
the fear of judicial insensitivity to nontraditional religious practices and recognizes that religion and law belong to completely
different traditions. Religion encompasses the mystic, spiritual
aspects of human nature, while law answers to the less esoteric
demands of logic and tradition. By this reasoning, any attempt to
measure the worth of a religious claim by the yardstick of rational argument and precedent is doomed to fail.
This may be-it is difficult to predict with any certainty-the animating force behind Scalia's rhetoric in Smith. The
argument would be that it is impossible for judges to fairly balance public policy concerns against religious interests. Such an
undertaking is inherently demeaning to religion, both because
the process of balancing tends to equate spiritual and temporal
concerns, and because the techniques and structures of the legal
system are ill-suited to comprehend the religious perspective.
At any rate, one can disagree with Scalia's conclusion, and
reasonable minds can differ about the grounds for his position.61
But the fact remains that a majority of the Court has made a
considered determination that use of the compelling interest test
in the free exercise context produces results that are arbitrary
61.

See supra note 34.
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and thus socially undesirable. On that basis, the Court has determined that continued use of the compelling interest test in
the free exercise context is not an appropriate exercise of the
judicial power."
Congress could have responded to Smith in a variety of
ways. Congress could have amended all federal laws regulating
illegal narcotics to mandate an exemption for the religious use of
peyote.' Congress could have passed a religious freedom statute based upon traditional legislative factfnding that exempted
specific religious practices from facially neutral laws."4 Exemptions could be legislatively mandated in cases involving Social
Security withholding,65 military attire," conscription,67 and
prisoner's rights," despite Supreme Court decisions to the contrary.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, however, is not a
permissible congressional response to Smith. Congress simply
lacks the constitutional authority to reverse the Court on issues
of judicial competence. RFRA presumes that application of the
compelling interest test to resolve religious objections to neutral
and generally applicable laws is within the judicial competence.
Smith strongly suggests that it is not. Courts must have the
power to make that assessment; thus, RFRA violates separation
of powers by denying the Court's right to determine its own
limitations.
IV.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Most separation of powers decisions turn upon the Court's

62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90.
63. This was the Oregon Legislature's response to Smith. In fact, some federal
narcotics laws currently provide an exemption for the religious use of peyote. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sched. I (c)(12); 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994).
64. Religious exemptions from neutral laws have been upheld against establishment clause challenges. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987) (upholding exemption from Title VII for religious corporations).
65. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish a free exercise exemption from paying social security taxes).
66. Compare Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to invalidate military rules preventing Orthodox Jewish officer from wearing yarmulke with
his uniform) with 10 U.S.C. § 774(b) (1988) (religious apparel may be worn with military uniforms so long as it is "neat and conservative").
67. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (denying conscientious
objector status to Catholic who believed Vietnam War was "unjust" because objector
was not a complete pacifist).
68. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (approving prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work to attend worship services).
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interpretation of a core constitutional provision. The justiciability
cases tend to invoke Article III,9 cases involving the executive
prerogative may interpret Article II,7' and cases dealing with
the scope of the legislative power unsurprisingly turn on Article
L1" Other decisions have framed the issue as whether one

branch has attempted to exercise powers reserved to another.7 2
A separation of powers argument based on the institutional

claim in Smith may appear somewhat novel due to its apparent
lack of a constitutional pedigree. After all, the majority's statements about institutional competence in Smith were offered in

passing and not supported by reference to the Constitution.
Since Smith does not invoke the Constitution to buttress its
findings on the institutional competence issue, it may be argued
that-like the prudential limits the Court places on justiciability-the institutional competence aspect of Smith is subject to
congressional reversal. This argument should be rejected for
several reasons.
First, the institutional argument that Scalia makes in Smith
can easily be refrained as a justiciability argument. Scalia finds
that judges cannot apply the compelling interest test to determine whether religious claimants should be exempt from facially
neutral laws because that test gives judges no opportunity to act

69. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (citizen suit
provisions of Endangered Species Act conflict with Article III); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 violates Article III insofar as it authorizes the jurisdiction of non-Article III
judges over civil proceedings); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (statute
purporting to authorize suit by nonadverse parties violates Article III); United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (striking down statute that provided rule of
decision in particular cases as violative of Article III); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (Judiciary Act of 1789, by purporting to expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, violates Article III); see also Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 409 (1792) (striking down statute that provided executive or legislature power
to review judicial decisions).
70. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (independent counsel provisions of Ethics in Government Act do not violate the appointments clause); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (portions of Federal Election Commission Act
violate the appointments clause, Article II, § 2).
71. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (striking down one-house legislative veto provision in Immigration and Nationality Act as violative of Article I, § 7).
72. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (creation of U.S.
Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch that performs legislative duties, does not violate separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 violates separation of powers because it requires the Comptroller General, an officer answerable to Congress, to
perform executive functions).
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judiciously. Either all religious claimants prevail, or the Court
must winnow the claimants out on the basis of inappropriate
inquiries into centrality or other ineffective criteria. Scalia's
argument can be reduced to the proposition that the compelling
interest test, in the free exercise context, is not a judicially manageable standard for resolving these cases. Lack of judicially
manageable standards is a traditional ground for holding that
the dispute is nonjusticiable, and thus not a "case or controversy"
within the Article III jurisdiction of the courts.7 3
In the alternative, the Court's institutional argument may
prove to have a foundation in the Establishment Clause. Given
the current state of uncertainty surrounding the Court's establishment jurisprudence,7 4 it is not surprising that the Smith
majority sidestepped this issue. But it has been widely acknowledged that judicial decisions providing religious plaintiffs with
exemptions from facially neutral laws raise concerns under the
Establishment Clause.7 5 The issue is whether it is appropriate
for the government to hold nonreligious individuals accountable
under such laws when religious individuals receive preferential
treatment.
It is true that neither the Establishment Clause nor Article
III is explicitly invoked in Smith as a basis for the Court's observations about institutional limitations. However, those who
would argue that Congress can override a mere prudential ex-

73. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (stating that the absence of judicially discoverable or manageable standards indicates that a case is a nonjusticiable
political question); see also Council on the Role of the Courts, THE ROLE OF COURTrS
IN AMERICAN SocIETY 101-20 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984) (discussing the parameters of judicial competence). See also, Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 759-62 (1992) (exploring the relationship between Smith
and justiciability principles, including the political question doctrine).
74. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1980) (arguing that the
Court's tests for interpreting the religion clauses provide no guidance and conflict
with the constitutional text); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1992) (describing confusion in existing religion
clause doctrine); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795
(1993) and Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993)
(presenting competing perspectives on the Lemon test).
75. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
415 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (finding that property tax exemptions for religious organizations raised establishment
clause issue, but ultimately affirming their constitutionality); see also, Philip B.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90).
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pression of the Court's views would do well to consider the many
cases in which the Court has restrictively defined its own jurisdiction (based at least in part on competence concerns) and articulated a constitutional basis for its position at a later time.
For example, the Court has refused, in an unbroken series of
cases dated from 1849, to resolve claims brought under the
Guarantee Clause."8 The Constitution expressly guarantees a
republican form of government to the states.77 These cases are
deemed to present nonjusticiable political questions due to the
perceived lack of judicially manageable standards for their resolution.78 In these decisions, the Court defines the institutional
limits of the federal judicial power without a clear constitutional
mandate.79 Moreover, the Guarantee Clause cases demonstrate
that the Court has flatly refused to enforce an enumerated constitutional right. This is, on its face, 0 a more troubling reservation of the judicial power than the limiting construction of the
free exercise right that occurred in Smith.
The political question doctrine as a whole, including but not
limited to the Guarantee Clause and apportionment decisions,
may provide the most straightforward example available of institutional concerns as a driving force in the Court's jurisprudence.
Where a dispute is deemed to be "textually committed to a coordinate political department,""1 or where "judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving the controversy are
lacking," 2 then the Court will dismiss the proceedings as in-

76. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (declaring cases
brought under the guarantee clause nonjusticiable).
77. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
78. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (malapportionment cases
brought under Equal Protection Clause are justiciable; provides classic formulation of
political question doctrine).
79. Luther does not turn on Article III, but instead holds that the power to
recognize a republican form of government rests with the legislature, which can delegate that power to the executive. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-44.
80. This effect was mitigated somewhat by Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-09, in which
the Court decided that malapportionment cases were justiciable when brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
81. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (qualifications of
members of Congress not a political question despite provisions of Article I, § 5); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983) (constitutionality of legislative veto not a
political question despite grant of power to Congress to establish uniform rules regarding naturalization).
82. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217); see also
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (issue of time limits for state ratification of a constitutional amendment presents a political question, in part due to the
absence of satisfactory criteria for judicial determination).
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volving a nonjusticiable political question. The political question
doctrine is not derived from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III;' thus its constitutional pedigree is open to
challenge. It may be based on separation of powers; alternatively, it may be intended to preserve judicial capital and limit the
influence of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society."
The Pullman abstention doctrine' also reflects judicial concerns about competence. Pullman requires federal courts to refrain from deciding cases that turn on an unclear issue of state
law when resolution of the state issue by a state court might
make the federal court's ruling on federal or constitutional issues
unnecessary.8 Abstention is rooted in considerations of federalism and comity, and lacks an independent constitutional basis. 87 It is also premised on concerns about the competence of
the federal judiciary when resolving unclear questions of state
law.
The Court has previously professed incompetence in cases
involving free exercise rights.' The church property cases, beginning in 1872 with Watson v. Jones,9 epitomize the Court's
institutional reluctance to resolve certain types of intra-church
controversies. In Watson, the Court refused to resolve a property
dispute between competing factions of the Presbyterian Church.
Since Watson antedated judicial recognition of the concept of selective incorporation,' this rule was not initially predicated upon the First Amendment.9 ' The Court continues to dismiss reli-

83. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.62, at 148
(2d ed. 1994) (describing political question doctrine as "not derived from Article III").
84. Id.
85. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (establishing the
abstention doctrine).
86. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, § 12.2, at 687 (discussing Pullman abstention).

87.

Id. at 688-91. It has been argued that abstention itself violates the sepa-

ration of powers doctrine, on the grounds that judges are usurping the legislative
function. See generally Martin H. Radish, Abstention, Separation of Powers and the
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984).
88. In addition to the church property cases, various free exercise decisions
have noted that courts are not competent to act as "arbiters of scriptural interpretation." See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)

(same).
89. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (refusing to resolve a property dispute between national and local Presbyterian organizations).
90. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 n.4 (1969).

91.

Subsequent church property decisions have grounded this doctrine in the

First Amendment. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

21

26

Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

gious property disputes that cannot be resolved by resort to "neutral principles."92
The academic freedom doctrine, in which the Court defers to
the autonomy of schools and universities across a wide variety of
specific activities, also originated as a common law rule. One
example of this doctrine is the issue of academic discipline. May
a student who is dissatisfied with a grade challenge that grade
in court? Early state cases show a consistent pattern of courts
refusing to intervene in matters of student discipline. 3 Later
cases grounded the academic freedom doctrine in the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment and extended it to prohibit
states from requiring university faculty to disavow connections
with the Communist Party.' While these two aspects of the
academic freedom doctrine are distinct, the pattern again demonstrates a common-law tradition of deference to university autonomy evolving into a view that such deference was compelled, in
certain cases, by the First Amendment.
More recent examples are also available. In 1992, the Court
refused-on separation of powers grounds-to effectuate an explicit congressional authorization of citizen standing intended to
permit interested parties to challenge the legality of agency
decisionmaking.9 5 Prior to Lujan, most court observers viewed
(ruling that disputes regarding clerical selection were immunized from judicial review
by the Free Exercise Clause); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 440; Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976) (state courts constitutionally barred from overturning decisions of church ecclesiastical court regarding internal matters of church governance).
92.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) established that the Court may,
consistent with the First Amendment, resolve church property disputes that turn on
.neutral principles of law."
93. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882 (Md. 1924) (upholding right of college to refuse to enroll student based on prior disciplinary record); Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), affd, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. 1962)
(upholding dismissal of students from Catholic university based on participation in
civil marriage ceremony); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435 (N.Y. App. Div.
1928) (university attendance is a privilege that can be denied without an express
reason); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 171 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 748 (1943) (institution's right to discipline students will not be questioned
absent arbitrary or unlawful action). See generally Stephen C. Veltri, Free Speech in
Free Universities, 19 OHO N.U. L. REv. 783 (1993) (summarizing common law development of academic freedom principles).
94. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Fifteen years
earlier, the Court found no constitutional infirmity in an identical statute. See Adler
v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952).
95. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (Congress cannot create a right to bring citizen suits to enjoin violations of the Endangered Species Act).
Lujan demonstrated a Court restrictively defining its powers on several levels. Justice Scalia, in a portion of the opinion not joined by the majority, found that the

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/2

22

1995]

Brant:
Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word
RFRA

& SEPARATION OF POWERS

citizen suit provisions as a legislative mandate sufficient to override the "prudential" rule of standing prohibiting generalized

grievances. But Lujan, quite unexpectedly, struck down the citizen suit provision on a constitutional basis, namely the injury-infact requirement of Article III.'
The point is clear. Critics of Smith who view the Court's
institutional argument as "merely prudential," or "dicta," should
be wary of overconfidence. By the time the constitutionality of
RFRA reaches the Supreme Court, a constitutional foundation
for that argument may well come into play.
Academic reaction to the Court's institutional argument in
Smith has been mixed.97 Professor Laycock argues that the
Court's position is both incorrect (because of the ubiquitous use
of balancing tests in other contexts) and illegitimate (because the
Court employed "activist" means to achieve a "conservative"
outcome and because conceptions of the judicial role cannot authorize a refusal to enforce enumerated constitutional rights)."

Laycock also notes that the "parade of horribles" cited by Scalia
is horrible, if at all, only because judges are responsible for
awarding each of the hypothetical exemptions, not because of the
actual result.'
This argument leads rather neatly to the conclusion that

Congress "solved" the Court's institutional problem by passing
RFRA. 1° Now that the Court is balancing pursuant to RFRA
rather than the Constitution, responsibility for the outcome of
judicial decisions is shared between Congress and the Court. If

plaintiffs could not demonstrate redressability (an essential component of standing)
because it was unclear that the agencies involved in the dispute would follow a judicial order. Id. at 2137.
96. Lujan is widely read as an unpersuasive effort to "constitutionalize" one of
the prudential limits on standing, i.e., the prohibition on generalized grievances.
Under this reading, Lujan is a separation of powers decision in which the Court
unexpectedly locates a constitutional infirmity where there had previously been no
more than a prudential limitation. While I do not agree with Scalia's opinion in
Lujan, I find the case instructive for those inclined to underestimate the force of
Smith's institutional argument. See generally Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (arguing that Lujan lacks a constitutional foundation and is inconsistent with historical
practice).
97. The largest part of the response has been critical. See supra note 34. But
Smith has some defenders. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
98. Laycock, supra note 43, at 30-39.
99. Laycock, supra note 43, at 30-39.
100.
1990 Hearings, supra note 9, at 77-78 (Appendix 3-Letter to Chairman
Don Edwards from Douglas Laycock) (Sept. 27, 1990).
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Congress disagrees with the Court's interpretation of RFRA, the
statute can be amended as necessary.
Professor Laycock also argues that the institutional view of
Smith amounts to judicial abdication of the Court's role in enforcing the Constitution. He rejects the institutional argument
because "the judicial role is defined by the Constitution; the
Constitution is not defined by changing conceptions of the judicial role." 1
This is a lovely chiasmus, but is misleading both as a critique of Smith and as a description of the judicial role. As noted
previously, Smith did not find that enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause was inconsistent with the judicial role. The Court
merely rejected the use of the compelling interest test and substituted a neutrality standard. Enforcement of the Free Exercise
Clause continues under this new standard.0 2 Thus, it is hardly
fair to accuse the Smith Court of retreating from its obligation to
construe and enforce the Free Exercise Clause; the decision did
precisely that.
Even more fundamentally, constitutional interpretation is
the cornerstone of the judicial role. But it is the constitutional
text that is binding, not judicial constructions thereof. The compelling interest test was created by the Court, not the founding
fathers. To say that considerations of the judicial role, or of judicial competence, should play no part in constitutional interpretation is to place Dred Scott on the same footing as the Fourteenth
Amendment. Judicial rules for enforcing constitutional commands are important, but to suggest that judges lack the authority to modify them is to unduly confine judicial prerogative.
A more troubling argument is that the Court's institutional
judgment is limited to its context, namely defining the contours
of exemptions from facially neutral laws mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause. 3 Under this view, Smith rejected the compelling interest test because the resulting exemptions would impose
a greater burden on government than the Constitution requires.

101. Laycock, supra note 43, at 38-39.
102. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct.
2217 (1993) (applying Smith rule to strike down ordinances prohibiting animal sacri-

fice).
103. There is language in the opinion to support this reading. At one point, in
rejecting the compelling interest test, the Court says: "We conclude today that the
sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges." Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
Later, the Court concludes the section by stating: "The First Amendment's protection
of religious liberty does not require this." Id. at 889.
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Once again, this argument supports the conclusion that Congress
solved the Court's institutional problem by grounding the compelling interest test in a statutory right independent of the Constitution.
However, there is a problem with limiting the institutional
argument in Smith to its context. Such a limitation means that
the Court is institutionally competent to apply the compelling
interest test pursuant to a federal statute, yet institutionally
incompetent to do so pursuant to clear and applicable constitutional precedent.
If this is true, then Smith is indeed the absurd decision its
critics claim. The First Amendment explicitly guarantees free
exercise rights, so a reading of Smith that suggests the Court
was seeking more explicit legislative authority to support its use
of the compelling interest test (as in Finley)"°4 renders the First
Amendment superfluous and turns the Supremacy Clause on its
head. Only if Smith is read as a declaration of judicial incompetence to balance religious freedom against neutral government
interests, regardless of whether those liberties are enshrined in
the Constitution or a federal statute, does the decision acquire a
claim to coherence.
Once Smith is read in a manner that accords the institutional claim its full force, the infirmities of RFRA are apparent. The
legislature cannot by fiat prescribe judicial competence where it
is otherwise lacking and Congress makes no effort to do so in
RFRA. The Findings of Fact and Statements of Purpose are
silent on this issue,"° and the legislative history suggests that
neither the House nor the Senate seriously considered the competence problem.
Professor Laycock and others have pointed out that the
Court's characterization of Yoder 0'° and Pierce"°7 as "hybrid"
cases is both unconvincing and disturbing."l8 Since the "hybrid"
interest in both decisions is produced by the combination of enumerated and unenumerated'" rights, privileging combined
104. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Finley creates no such difficulties, because there is nothing in either Article III or the Federal Tort Claims Act
that explicitly guarantees the rights of pendent parties to be heard in a federal forum.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a), (b) (Supp. V 1993).
106. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting Amish children from
compulsory school attendance).
107. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (upholding right of parents
to send children to private schools).
108. Laycock, supra note 43, at 37; Gordon, supra note 34, at 98.
109. The unenumerated right in both cases is characterized in Smith as the
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claims over those involving free exercise rights alone has the
effect 110
of making "unenumerated rights superior to enumerated
ones."
Smith's critics are clearly correct in this assertion. But
Scalia's use of "hybrid rights" as an unartful tool to distinguish
troubling precedent simply does not weaken the force of the
Court's institutional argument. The fact that the Court draws its
boundaries illogically does not mean that its power to establish
those boundaries is suspect, any more than the Court's misguided application of standing principles in Lujan"' vitiates the entire doctrine of standing.
A literary analogy may be of use. Consider the captain of a
seagoing vessel. It has been argued that captains possess at least
two kinds of authority."2 The first is de jure authority based on
a commission or some other source of official status-another
way of saying that a captain has the power to command the ship
because she is the captain. The second source of authority is
based on the captain's personal experience and seamanship.
If we consider Justice Scalia as temporary captain"3 of the
judicial ship, we find that he clearly has a "commission," based
on existing constitutional precedent, to apply the compelling
interest test in Smith. He refuses to do so, not only in that particular case, but in any case where religious freedom must be
balanced against facially neutral laws. He does so because he
finds that judges lack the seamanship to safely accomplish the
task.
RFRA provides the Court with a second "commission" to
balance facially neutral laws against religious liberty claims. But
the commission is legislative-by definition less authoritative
than the language and precedent of the Constitution-and RFRA
has no effect on judicial seamanship. RFRA instructs judges to
sail into waters where the Supreme Court has sailed before-and
found impassable reefs.

"right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children." Smith, 494 U.S. at
881 (citations omitted).
110. Laycock, supra note 43, at 37.
111. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (striking down citizen
suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act based on separation of powers).
112.

GREG DENING, MR. BLIGH'S BAD LANGUAGE: PASSION, POWER AND THEATRE

ON THE BOUNTY 21-22, 80 (1992).
113. I intend no extended comparison between Justice Scalia and the infamous
Captain Bligh. The analogy merely provides a literary perspective on authority versus institutional competence.
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V. CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVDUAL LIBERTIES

Much of the current academic debate regarding RFRA's
constitutionality turns on the scope of congressional power to
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 4 While
the extent of congressional authority to enact RFRA is an important issue, I believe the separation of powers inquiry is an independent measure of the statute's constitutional status.
Nonetheless, the cases involving congressional power under
the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant here for another reason.
Supporters of RFRA have routinely offered these cases as analogies to RFRA; proof that Congress has routinely acted in a way
to protect individual liberties that the Court has not protected on
its own initiative." 5 Since I view these cases as clearly distinguishable from RFRA, a brief overview is in order.
RFRA is not the first congressional foray into the field of
individual rights that appears to conflict with a previous constitutional decision."" Congress has previously attempted-with
mixed results-to legislate individual rights that the Court has
found unprotected by the Constitution. On one level, the question of whether Congress may enact legislation that "broadens"
the scope of a constitutional provision is as old as Marbury v.
Madison."7 But Marbury tells us only that Congress cannot
expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction; the issue of
when and how Congress can "second guess" the Court on consti-.

114. See supra note 18; see also Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 245-52 (arguing that RFRA is within the scope
of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas C. Berg, What
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 301, 362-68 (1994).
115.
See Laycock, supra note 114.
116.
For example, Congress recently "overruled" Supreme Court interpretations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by amending the relevant provisions of the statute. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105
Stat. 107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., & 42
U.S.C.) (arguably reversing five Supreme Court decisions). Congress' power to reverse
the Court on issues of statutory interpretation has been thoughtfully evaluated in the

scholarly literature. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991); Michael E. Solomine & James L.
Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 425 (1992). Because the statutory interpretation function is
distinct from the Court's power to construe the Constitution, these legislative initiatives do not present a separation of powers problem and will not be discussed in this
article.
117.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that Congress cannot expand original
jurisdiction of Supreme Court).
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tutional questions continues to recur in a variety of intriguing
contexts.
The 1960s and 1970s remain the high water mark in the
ongoing dialogue between Congress and the Court on the scope
of individual liberties. Voting rights"' and criminal procedure" 9 were topics of judicial and legislative concern during
that era, as the Court considered the ramifications of the Voting
Rights Act and Congress responded to a series of Warren Court
decisions expanding the scope of procedural rights available to
120
criminal defendants.
The leading voting rights decision, which some view as resolving the question of whether Congress can prohibit practices
that the Court has held constitutionally permissible, is
Katzenbach v. Morgan.2 ' In Morgan, New York officials were
enjoined from enforcing a state law that required voters educated in Puerto Rico to establish their literacy in English. The injunction was based on section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act,
which broadly prohibited the use of literacy tests. Seven years
earlier, prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, the
Court sustained a South Carolina law requiring voters to prove
their literacy as consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 22 Lassiter held that no constitutional violation
exists absent proof that a literacy test has been discriminatorily
12
applied.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Morgan, found
that the Voting Rights Act passed constitutional muster even
though it prohibited a state practice that probably would survive
constitutional scrutiny under Lassiter. In effect, the Court found
that Congress, acting pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, could prohibit state conduct that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prohibit of its own force.
In a much discussed footnote to Morgan,24 Justice
Brennan attempted to confine the contours of this newly recognized congressional power. In this footnote, Brennan suggested

118.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-29.
119.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing rules governing criminal confessions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence
obtained through an unlawful search or seizure).
120.
Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 with 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
121.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
122. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
123. Id. at 53-54.
124.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 247-61 (1971).
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that Congress could "enforce" the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights, but could not "restrict, abrogate or dilute" those
rights.12 This has been characterized as the "one way ratchet"
argument, 2 and its force has been widely disputed. 27
In Oregon v. Mitchell,'28 Justice Brennan's views evolved a
step further. In an opinion joined by only two other Justices, he
hinted that Congress might have the power, again acting under
Section 5, to dilute constitutional rights that the Court had previously recognized where Congress was to "unearth new evidence" while exercising its special competence in fact-finding.'29
Under this theory, Congress may statutorily require either more
or less protection for a constitutional right than the Constitution,
as interpreted by the Court, requires. While the scope of this
theory provides Congress with ample authority to enact RFRA, it
has never commanded the support of a majority of the Court.
The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the extent of
the "Morgan power" came in the affirmative action context. In
Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. F.C.C.,' the Court upheld minority
preferences in the awarding of radio licenses without a finding of
past discrimination. 3 ' The Court made clear that Congress
can, acting under Section 5, institute racial preferences even
where such measures were not constitutionally required.'32
It is also worth considering several bills that, while never
enacted," have been introduced and debated in Congress.
Each would have the effect of expanding, and in some cases
contracting, the scope of constitutional rights previously an-

125. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
126. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1230-39 (1978); William
Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 603, 606-09 (1975); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan 'Power" and the Forced
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 830-34 (1986).
127. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 124, at 247-61. Justice Harlan also questioned the
force of the "one-way ratchet theory" in his dissent in Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668.

128.

400 U.S. 112 (1970).

129.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 249 n.31.

130. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that Congress, but not state and local governments, may authorize preferences for racial minorities without a finding of past discrimination).
131. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 569-70.
132. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The issue raised by the dissenters in the affirmative action cases is whether certain racial preferences may themselves violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
133.
Since they have never been enacted, these bills have not been challenged on
separation of powers or any other grounds.
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nounced by the Court. The Human Life Bill,"M first introduced
in the 97th Congress, provided that human life begins at conception. This bill would have expanded the rights of the unborn and
the correlative power of states to enact laws protecting fetal life.
The bill would have simultaneously limited the constitutional
right of women to terminate a pregnancy, a right established by
Roe v. Wade 5' and recently reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.'36 The Human Life Bill has never progressed to a
floor vote.
An alternative bill, the Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA),'37
was introduced in the 102d Congress. This bill would expand the
scope of a woman's privacy rights with regard to an unborn child
beyond the level that the Court is currently prepared to recognize as compelled by the Constitution. While the FOCA does not
raise a serious concern under Justice Brennan's "one-way ratchet" theory,'38 it nevertheless represents a congressional effort to
provide greater protection for a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy
than the Supreme Court's current "undue burden"
139
test.
The controversial Racial Justice Act"4 was introduced in
the 102d Congress as well. It would extend the right of equal
protection to permit defendants on death row to use statistical
evidence to demonstrate that capital punishment was unlawfully
administered on the basis of their race. Such a right is not currently recognized in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
RFRA is distinctly different from each of these other congressional forays into the field of individual rights. Both RFRA
and the aforementioned legislative initiatives represent the congressional perspective on the appropriate scope of a constitutional right. In each instance, the congressional perspective differs
from the considered judgment of the Court. However, none of the
other legislative undertakings, whether proposed or enacted,

134.
135.
136.
137.

S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
S. 25, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).

138.

In the final Senate Report on the FOCA, it was argued that FOCA does

not "restrict, abrogate or dilute" any Constitutional guarantee. S. REP. No. 42, 103d
Cong. 1st Sess. (1991). This view assumes that neither a parent nor the state have
any constitutional interest in protecting the life of the unborn.
139. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (substituting an "undue burden" test for the
.strict scrutiny" approach used by Roe to evaluate the constitutionality of state restrictions on abortions).
140. S. 1249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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threatens the Court's determination of its institutional capabilities. For this reason, none of these bills triggers the separation of
powers problem of RFRA.'4 RFRA is, quite simply, unique in
that it denies the right of the Court to establish the limits of the
judicial function.
VI. THE LIMITS OF LITERALISM
It may reasonably be asked whether there is any natural
limit to the capacity of the judiciary-or the legislative and executive branches-to declare their incompetence in a particular
subject area. Can the President declare himself incompetent to
execute laws regarding desegregation of schools? Can the judiciary proclaim itself incapable of determining when a set of facts
amounts to an unlawful restraint upon trade, in violation of the
Sherman Act? Can the Court declare itself unable to determine
what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure?
I believe there are limiting principles available. The Court
cannot refuse to enforce an explicit provision of the Constitution.
As noted earlier, Smith did not attempt to follow any such
course. Rather, the Court proclaimed its inability to apply and
enforce the compelling interest test pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, and substituted a neutrality standard.4 2 Since the
Smith decision, the Court has reaffirmed that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits a state from enacting laws that discriminate
against a particular religion.'43
The neutrality standard established by Smith and reaffirmed in Lukumi Babalu Aye is certainly less protective of religious liberty than the compelling interest test. The inadequacy of
the new standard as a measure of religious freedom has been
persuasively argued.'" Nevertheless, those facts are simply insufficient to compel the conclusion that the Court is no longer
enforcing the Free Exercise Clause. The Court has merely interpreted the clause more narrowly than before, relying on institutional limitations.
If the Court proclaimed itself incapable of enforcing the

141.

The bills in question may raise other constitutional difficulties. The Human

Life Bill certainly runs afoul of Justice Brennan's one-way ratchet; thus, to the ex-

tent that theory can command a majority of the Court, the bill may exceed the scope
of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
142. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.

143.
(1993).
144.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2234
See supra note 34.
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Sherman Act on the grounds that no appropriate limiting principle could be found to separate lawful restraints of trade from
unlawful combinations, then the outcome would be different.
Congress could then redraw the contours of the statute in order
to make the law more susceptible to judicial enforcement and
interpretation. Congress cannot, however, redraft the statute to
incorporate a prior constitutional standard that the Court once
used but has since rejected as unworkable. This is what Congress has done in the course of enacting RFRA.
Congress undoubtedly has the power to limit the Court's
prudential doctrines. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 is a
permissible response to Finley, and Congress could override
other Court decisions that turn on the interpretations of jurisdictional statutes.'45 Congressional overrides to prudential doctrines such as abstention are more problematic, but the legislature probably retains the power to restrict or abolish such judgemade principles, for their relationship to judicial competency is
more attenuated than the claim made in Smith.
Congress' exercise of its "Morganpower" is also restricted by
the Constitution. This suggests that the church property cases
and other examples of judicial "incompetence" that are based
upon (or have acquired) a firm constitutional footing cannot be
legislatively overridden.
It may be helpful to distinguish a slight variation on RFRA.
The Supreme Court has held that aliens interdicted upon the
high seas are not entitled to due process protection, unlike aliens
who have gained entry to the United States.' Let us conjecture an unlikely scenario in which Congress responds to the
Haitian exodus by enacting a "Refugee Act." The Act specifically
grants aliens seeking admission to the United States a uniform
level of due process protection, regardless of whether they have
physically gained "entry" to the country. The specific type of due
process required is not enumerated; instead, reference is made to
prior Supreme Court decisions providing certain due process
protections to aliens physically present in the United States.
Like RFRA, the new Refugee Act would, in practical terms,

145.
See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (finding that
domestic relations cases are an exception to the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction). As Justice Blackmun noted, there is no coherent construction of the diversity
statute that supports a domestic relations exception; the Court's decision properly
rests on "longstanding [federal] practice." Id. at 2217 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547
(1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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reverse the effect of previous Supreme Court decisions. Like
RFRA, the statute would result in more people being entitled to
claim rights enumerated in the Constitution, even though the
refugees' claims would be based on both constitutional and
statutory grounds. However, the Refugee Act would raise no
separation of powers problem. Like the Voting Rights Act and
the other bills discussed in Part V of this article, the Refugee Act
presents no challenge to the judicial competence. Judges need
only apply a test, with which they are already familiar, to a
larger group of persons.
This distinction from RFRA is critical. The Court has never
found the due process tests to be beyond the judicial competence,
either as applied to nonresident aliens, or in any other context.
Since the test for due process is within the judicial competence,
Congress can lawfully expand the number of persons subject to
the test. Once the test at issue has been rejected on institutional
grounds, however, as the compelling interest test was in Smith,
Congress cannot force the Court to return to its prior standard.
VII. CONCLUSION

The institutional argument should be recognized as the
single most defensible basis for the Smith decision. Because of
its troubling implications, it is also the most tempting aspect of
Smith to disregard. Previous critiques of Smith have failed to
develop the institutional argument, and thereby deprive it of its
true force.
If the Court's rhetoric on institutional competence is taken
seriously, then RFRA cannot be sustained. By directing the
courts to apply the compelling interest test in the free exercise
context, RFRA presumes judicial competence to perform that
task. The subtext of Smith denies that competence. This article
has suggested that the institutional argument is based on legitimate concerns and may be supported by a constitutional foundation, thus meeting the claim that Congress can override prudential expressions of judicial incompetence. Because RFRA denies
the Court an essential and fundamental right-the right to determine the boundaries of judicial capacity-the statute violates
separation of powers.
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